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Abstract. The purpose of this study is to elaborate on the concept of
“ambient space,” the space which surrounds and moves with the self. For
this purpose, this study focuses on the learning processes of the creation
and viewing of art, related to both artists and viewers. Furthermore,
we intend to deepen thought about ambient space and reconsider the di-
chotomy of “ﬁgure and ground.” Through a workshop at an art museum,
we showed that by stepping up from the logical type of ﬁgure-ground re-
versal perception - the ﬁgure-ﬁgure switch - the ground-ground switch,
the perception of surfaces’ layouts, can be perceived.
1 A Step Up in Logical Type
When we see evidence of distinguished skills, even if we cannot explain the ex-
cellence of the skill in words we can still be aware of it. Bateson’s learning theory
discusses the essential dilemmas and diﬃculties related to skill learning and the
transmission of skills. As Bateson pointed out, one dilemma faced by artists is
about a double eﬀect of practice: “It makes him, on the one hand, more able to
do whatever it is he is attempting; and, on the other hand, by the phenomenon
of habit formation, it makes him less aware of how he does it” (Bateson, 1972,
p.138). Another dilemma is that “if his attempt is to communicate about the
unconscious components of his performance, then it follows that he is on a sort
of moving stairway (or escalator) about whose position he is trying to commu-
nicate but whose movement is itself a function of his eﬀorts to communicate”
(op. cit., p. 138). Bateson deeply understood “that consciousness is necessarily
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selective and partial, i.e., that the content of consciousness is, at best, a small
part of truth about the self” (op. cit., p. 144). However, we agree with Bateson
that the unconscious, as postulated by Freud, is not essentially unknowable. The
framework he proposed assumed the existence of meta-level contexts (an invis-
ible frame) that cover the algorithms in the area of so-called unconsciousness.
In other words, the framework assumes the existence of things that enable mea-
surement and judgment only as a function of logical typing. Bateson was a key
ﬁgure in pointing out the reliance on the invisible and unconscious meta-frame
and the great belief in the capability to step up logical types when we are in a
dead-end situation, such as a double bind or an antinomy. He clearly pointed
out this belief they can be a condition for learning.
2 Ambient Space
The purpose of this study is to elaborate on the concept of “ambient space,”
the importance of which was emphasized not only by G. Bateson but also by
ecological psychologist J. J. Gibson and the painter J. Pollock, who developed
their ecological views at around the same time. Ambient space refers to the space
which surrounds and moves with the self. Bateson would say that it was the in-
visible context which is organised by logical types which can be recombined in
several ways. For Gibson, it would be an environment whose structure would be
speciﬁed by “ambient optic arrays,” which refers to ambient light with structure.
Ambient light means that “light would come to every point; it would surround
every point; it would be environing at every point” (Gibson, 1979, p. 51). Light
ﬁlls in so as to illuminate the structure of the environment, scattering and run-
ning against the myriad surfaces of objects in ambient space. “This implies an
arrangement of some sort, that is, a pattern, a texture, or a conﬁguration” (op.
cit., p. 51). In Gibson’s ground theory (1950), “space was no longer described
as a void containing detached objects, but rather as intersecting surfaces; space
was structurally more complex and diﬀerently organized”(Lombardo, 1987, p.
24). That is, Gibson denied Newton’s concept of empty space, which declared
that “the physical spatial world consisted of “objects” (static, self-contained
things) possessing size, shape and location within space (a void)” (op. cit., p.
24). In ambient space, when we think of the relation between self and the ambi-
ent light which surrounds it, for example, it is necessary not to think ﬁrst of the
“things” which are related (the “relata”) such as “self” and “light”, but rather
the opposite, so “the relations are to be thought of as somehow primary, the re-
lata as secondary.” “Beyond this, it is claimed that the relations are of the sort
generated by processes of information exchange” (op. cit., p.154). Additionally,
Lombardo (1987) indicated that Gibson’s ecological concept of the ambient op-
tic array (which is that reﬂected light diverges outward into the medium, but at
any given point in the medium, light is converging from surrounding (ambient)
objects) is very similar to Leibnitz’s “monad”:
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described as the embodiment of the surrounding whole within the part,
an entity “mirrors” its relationships to all surrounding entities. The
monad provided an alternative building block to Newton’s atom, of-
fering a relational view of reality. Instead of intrinsically independent
atoms (elements), each of which is internally simple, the relational view
rejects the idea of absolute parts independent of the whole” (op. cit.,
p. 52).
The artist Jackson Pollock expended great mental energy and strength to de-
scribe the ambient space. As a learner, Pollock analyzed the ambient space sur-
rounding his body, invented painting techniques such as dripping and pouring,
and attempted to reconstruct the ambient space on the canvas, the medium it-
self. However, generally speaking, describing and analyzing the ambient space is
diﬃcult. Although the idea of the ambient space that Gibson deﬁned and Pol-
lock demonstrated denies explanation by way of an analogy between the retinal
image and the picture by using the pictorial model, regrettably even paintings by
Pollock, who studied ambient space, are treated as ﬁnished products for image
analysis. With all methods of fractal analyses for complex systems (Taylor et al.,
2000), the idea that many hierarchical layers of arbitrary shapes are regarded
as “ground” and the segments of “lines” intersecting hierarchical blocks, on the
other hand, are regarded as “ﬁgures” is nothing but a tenet of image analysis. In
the pictorial model, optical stimulation is regarded as having properties of mo-
mentarily ﬁxed conditions; that is, a series of separate static pictures. However,
the medium ﬁlled with light in ambient space does not form into an “image.”
Lombardo (1987, p. 39) explained that
Aristotle sees the medium as revealing forms rather than transmitting
something material (eidola). The medium is a ﬁeld actualized through
light. It is not a void or an empty space — it possesses the power of
“transparency”. The perceiver sees forms through the medium; the per-
ceiver does not see the medium... as Gibson would say, the perceiver does
not see “light” —the perceiver sees by means of light.
3 Focus on the Creation Process (Learning Process)
of the Arts: Reconsideration of the Dichotomy
of “Figure and Ground”
Art is commonly concerned with learning, i.e., with bridging the gap between the
more or less unconscious premises acquired by learning and the more episodic
content of consciousness and immediate action (Bateson, 1972, p.308). This
study focuses on the learning processes of creation and viewing, related to both
artists and viewers, in order to elaborate the idea of ambient space. As an ex-
ample, imagine that someone is asked to remember the assignment of white and
black go stones on a go board after the ﬁnal move? It is very diﬃcult to guess
correctly whether a stone is white or black by tracing the position on the go
board from one corner in turns. It also has a high usage of memory resources.
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There is an easier way which is well known to the people learning to play go.
This is simply to recall each move from the beginning in turns, and to assign the
go stones to positions based on the moves. This study focuses on such a learning
process. The learning process which is the signiﬁcant focus of this study involves
re-experiencing our own and others’ learning processes. The learner need not
repeat any previous misunderstandings or settle for the top-down lectures of
specialists such as art historians or art critics, which are external to personal
memories and experiences.
Another aim of this study is to deepen thought about ambient space, reconsid-
ering the dichotomy of “ﬁgure and ground,” which Gestalt psychology proposed.
Considering a space as “the ambient space” that is ﬁlled with medium of the am-
bient optic array, the binary division into either ﬁgure or ground will be revealed
to be insuﬃcient to express such a space (Gibson, 1979). It is usually consid-
ered that “ground” is the expression of medium and is behind the “ﬁgure,” the
expression of the object. However, according to the deﬁnition of ambient space,
the medium surrounds the object not only behind but also to the fore, that
is, the whole. When seen from the perspective of ambient space, the idea of
“ﬁgure-ground reversal” (Rubin, 1915) becomes insigniﬁcant because the idea is
nothing but to return to a superﬁcial viewing of diﬀerence, keeping the propriety
claim of the dichotomy. But we don’t intend to completely deny the dichotomy
of ﬁgure and ground in the expression of space, insisting that it is too rough
and of no use. We would like to verify the problem of “ﬁgure and ground” in
a framework of stepping up the logical types as Bateson discussed. We did so
through a workshop at an art museum held in a demonstrative manner. The
details are described in the next section.
4 Workshop in an Art Museum
In this study, we would like to regard the arts as the imitation techniques used
to identify the structure of the ambient space. Which is to say that it is not a
problem of the technical transfer of skills acquired in one context to another. For
example, studying painting will not lead to the making of a robot that can paint.
However, creating a painting might utilize a modelling technique that has the
same action level with producing robots or dramas, in terms of the modelling of
the world.
This study accentuates the way of interdisciplinary research. Usually, as Bate-
son pointed out, interdisciplinary research occurs in a system in which, for ex-
ample, an ecologist will need a geologist to tell him about the rocks and soils
of the particular terrain which he is investigating (Bateson, 1972, p. 153). But
in this study, we use interdisciplinary in another sense: for example, the man
who studies the arrangement of leaves and branches in the growth of a plant
ﬁnds the formal relations between stems, leaves, buds to be analogous to the
formal relations of words in a sentence. He will discover a great academic value
in such studies. Those who think ﬁrst of the “things” which are related (the “re-
lata”) will dismiss any analogy between linguistic grammar and the anatomical
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structure of plants because they have no apparent similarity to each other. They
will not accept any resemblance between a leaf and a noun. But, one way of
interdisciplinary research is the very study of ﬁnding analogies between diﬀer-
ent things at a glance. In order to specify and step up the logical types in the
invisible contexts, it is claimed that the forms of the relations between commu-
nication and the histogenesis process should be investigated. What should be
imitated to reveal the formal relations is the form of the relationship structure.
To conduct research against this background to investigate skill transference in
art, a workshop was held in an art museum. Participants were directed to view
some oil paintings and after that to copy them with pastel crayons, step by step.
Visual artist Kenjiro Okazaki acted as facilitator. The details are as follows.
4.1 Time and Place
The workshop was held on December 24-25, 2011 in the exhibition hall and
a large meeting room at the National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo. The
participants viewed the original paintings in the exhibition hall, and then moved
to the large meeting room to reproduce the paintings which they viewed.
4.2 Participants
Fourteen adults participated (ﬁve men and nine women). The breakdown of their




– ten art students
4.3 Target Paintings for Reproduction
The target paintings were chosen with a focus on the historical development after
the modern period, in which various stages of the creation process were reﬂected
and observed in the style of painting; especially from the Impressionist period,
through Constructivism, up to the abstract period. The selected paintings which
the participants were required to reproduce in this workshop were the following
ﬁve paintings:
– “Gold Necklace” by Ryuzaburo Umehara (1913)
– “Roses and a Girl” by Kaita Murayama (1917)
– “Renee, Green Harmony” by Henri Matisse (1923)
– “Water Mirror” by Yasuo Kazuki (1942)
– “Dog” by Kunitaro Suda (1950)
The selected paintings share a key feature in that the layout of the layers of
colors perceived as ﬁgures and ground is crucial. For example, the paintings of
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Matisse, Kazuki and Suda have the same typical layout, where the layer of the
ﬁgure was ﬁrst painted, and then marginal layers, perceived as background, were
painted in the next step. Therefore, these paintings are comprised of a hind layer
of the ﬁgure and a fore layer of the ground. For example, in the case of the small
painting by Matisse (ﬁgure 1), the dark green portrait of a ﬁgure is surrounded
by a light green background, which is perceived as showing a kind of depth such
as falling into a dark hole.
Fig. 1. “Renee, Green Harmony” by Henri Matisse (1923)
4.4 Workshop Procedure
The facilitator, Okazaki, named each task from A to F (Table 1). In this study,
we report on the results of these tasks (the reproduction of the paintings) except
for tasks A-2, A-3, and B, which involved reproducing the artworks in words. We
describe the directions that Okazaki gave the participants before they viewed the
paintings in the exhibition hall as “memorizing.” We categorized the directions
given to the participants when they returned to the meeting room after viewing
the paintings and before their reproducing task as “recall.” The participants
were seated in rows in the meeting room so as not to give them a chance to
modify their works by referring to the reproduction processes of others. A video
recording was made of all the participants’ behaviors. Furthermore, in order to
make the painting conditions the same for all participants they received the same
type and number of drawing papers and the same set of pastel crayons (Sakura
Craypas, 12 colors).
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4.5 Criteria of Analysis
Six assessors were told to identify 14 types of behavior categories that we de-
ﬁned (Table 2), and they categorized the behaviors of the participants on the
videos using the video analyzing software ELAN ver.4.1.2 at the maximum time
resolution of the video rate. Each video scene was analyzed by two assessors.
4.6 Results and Discussion
Creating the Experience of Ambient Space by Using an Operating
Surface Layout. The selected paintings in our workshop shared the common
feature that the order of the layers between the ﬁgure and the ground is a signif-
icant key to understanding the paintings. Common sense dictates that usually
the ﬁgure is regarded as being in front of the ground. But the selected paint-
ings were created by using a reversal creation process, which was successful in
inducing a strange perception. When we see the ﬁrst painted surface layer in the
center of the canvas, we perceive it as something like a depression, with depth.
Conversely, in another painting we might perceive an ascending feeling. Using an
operating surface layout creates the way the medium is perceived of the ambient
space.
We are afraid to call the transition of perception induced by painting tech-
niques the experience of beauty. To elaborate, we have doubts about whether
the creation of beauty should be expected in the arts. To begin with, do artists
pursue beauty? Akiba attempted to introduce Leibniz’s idea of monadology to
a new aesthetic apart from Kant’s aesthetics (Akiba, 2011). Our question about
art and beauty mentioned above corresponds with Akiba’s thesis.
Kant attempted to give beauty the potential and the power to be constructed
in order to overcome the problems (mutual constraints, that is, the antinomy)
that are derived from each category of recognition (Kant, 1790). If this is so,
however, we believe beauty gives us nothing but optimistic hopes that all will
come out right, as if we are self-contained and without recognition of the truth
of the world.
On the contrary, the monads are never optimistic. Following on from the
philosophy of Aristotle, Leibniz postulated that sensing requires distance in time
or space (that is, there is no direct perception of the object itself), and that we
are surrounded by the medium (Leibniz, 1714). A simple explanation of monads
is that the senses are conﬁned by systems, but the outside is projected onto
the inner perception. This means that the objects outside are understood only
by a dissociation of the projected images between the inner perception and the
objects outside. It was revealed in this workshop that our understanding of the
perception of the object and depth, that is, the logical layers of space, was often
reversed. We assume that we comprehend the very logical layers of the space
(speaking in the Gibsonian viewpoint, the way of layout of surfaces); however,
we can actually perceive only that one. Furthermore, what is perceived is the gap
between steps of logical layers of the space which are indicated by color layers,
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Table 1. Tasks and directions
Task A
Object “Gold Necklace” by Ryuzaburo Umehara (1913)
“Roses and a Girl” by Kaita Murayama (1917)
“Renee, Green Harmony” by Henri Matisse (1923)
Memorization “View the paintings for 15 minutes. Memorize the paintings as if
you are witnesses.”
Recall “Reproduce the paintings in a limited time, six minutes for three
paintings. Reduce the number of colors as much as possible. Draw
with a simple combination of colors. You don’t need to ﬁnalize it
because these sketches are just memos.”
Task C
Object “Water Mirror” by Yasuo Kazuki (1942)
Memorization “Take 40 seconds, just a short wink of time. Go and memorize
the painting very quickly, and then draw the painting in full.”
Recall “Select one color, whichever you want. Reproduce the painting
in full in your sketch. Take about 15 seconds. Draw your memo-
rized impression quickly as if you are determining the layout of
snapshots, and as if to ﬁx the whole layout in one stroke and
one touch. Say, 15 seconds is exaggerated, but as short a time as
possible, in one minute is best.”
(During the reproducing process) “You can use the pastel crayons
freely. Then you can paint the whole of all the pictures at the same
time.”
Task C2
Object “Water Mirror” by Yasuo Kazuki (1942)
Memorization: “One more time, you should go to see the paintings for 10 or 20
seconds. Reproduce the paintings in only two colors. Run to the
hall to see the paintings and return here very quickly.In this case,
three minutes for reproducing.”
Recall “You should not use two colors at the same time, nor use the
two colors alternatively. If you begin to use the second color, you
can’t use the ﬁrst color again. It’s a two-color process like a color
print. Never use the ﬁrst color after you changed the color to the
second.”
Task D
Object “Dog” by Kunitaro Suda (1950)
Memorization “Same as the previous process. You should go to see the paintings
for one minute and reproduce the paintings.”
Recall “Reproduce the paintings with only two colors. Just as in the
previous process, if you begin to use the second color, you should
not use the ﬁrst color again. Yes, that way. Color over the drawing
paper eﬃciently. You may guess the value of the two colors as if
you are charged twice as much by a printer for using two colors.”
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Table 1. (Continued.)
Task E
Object “Renee, Green Harmony” by Henri Matisse (1923)
Memorization “Once more, go to see ‘Renee’ by Matisse. The time duration is
much shorter than in the previous case, 30 or 50 seconds.”
Recall “Reproduce the paintings with only two colors. Follow the same
method as the previous process in two minutes. The key point is
which color to use ﬁrst. You must meditate on which color should
be ﬁrst, considering that if you mistake the order of color use, you
cannot repair it, resulting in crucial damage to the reproduction.”
Task F
Object “Gold Necklace” by Ryuzaburo Umehara (1913)
Memorization “This painting’s title, ‘Gold Necklace’, is signiﬁcant. If you had to
express this painting with one color, what is that color?” (In this
case, the participants were required to reproduce the paintings
without an opportunity to view the painting.)
Recall “Use just two colors. Precise sketching ability is not
required. Paint a simple ﬁgure of a human.”
Table 2. Fourteen types of behavior categories
Behaviors without holding a crayon / Without contact with drawing paper
Pause: Without hand gesture 00
Movement: With hand gestures (painting gestures in air) 01
Looking for crayon 02
Behaviors with crayon
Drawing behaviors (Handling the crayon like a pencil / Contact with
drawing paper)
Tracing: Boundary (Tracing the outlines of the objects) 1
Reciprocating motion: Designated object (Drawing over the paper) 2
Reciprocating motion: Other objects (Drawing over the paper) 3
Painting behaviors (Drawing with the side of the crayon, like a wiper,
or using small broken-oﬀ bits of crayon / Contact with drawing paper)
Tracing: Boundary (Emphasizing the outline of the object such as brushing
in white around the object)
4
Reciprocating motion: Designated object (Drawing over the paper) 5
Reciprocating motion: Other objects (Drawing over the paper) 6
Pause behaviors (Handling a crayon Without contact with the paper)
Without hand gestures P0
With hand gestures (painting gestures in air) P1
Other (Rubbing the paper with ﬁngers, etc.) 7
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for example in the painting by Matisse, which demonstrate the breakdown of
logic, or the gap as the immeasurable depth.
The object being perceived might be like a code that we provisionally presup-
pose in order to accept throughmaking that breakdown of logic ﬁt the framework.
In this meaning, the object is regarded as an aim that perception processes cannot
validate if it is not regarded as it is. Its existence is neither directly perceived nor
proved deﬁnitely in advance but is regarded as the aim that makes the perception
and action realized, and in the midst of the perception process this aim governs or
regulates action, that is, the personal standard. For example, computing is only
possible when the existence of a solution as well as the solvability of a problem is
ensured. To the contrary, computing is meaninglesswhen the solution is constantly
valid. The thought and the perception are not establishedwhen the provisional ob-
ject (referred to as “object X”), such as solutions in computing,may be derived but
has not been directly comprehended. In other words, the object X is comprehended
as what governs the medium, as the volume that parts recognition in the percep-
tion process; that is, the gap. Depth perception is the very possibility of action and
does not enclose our perception in mere subjectivity. These are referred to as open
access externalities, the conditions that enable the existence of others, for that rea-
son. We suppose that the ambient space which Gibson deﬁned can be interpreted
in this way. The object X is the gap that enables our perception, the medium, and
the opportunity for reﬂection. Additionally, that is, a personal standard, which is
an opportunity for speculating about actions. The object X has not existed yet,
but is deﬁnitely possible in the future. This temporal gap, the time delay, and the
volume of the medium are the surrounding space of our perception, and this is also
the condition of which time consists. This provisional object X can be something
like a hope that is cast on the world, and is returned to us in the perception process.
We don’t see the object in a painting, nor is the object painted in the paint-
ing. In discussing Matisse’s painting, we ﬁrst operate our perceptions, capture
the gap that is the very depth (overlapping layers of paints), enter in it, and
try to perceive the depth consciously; we perceive the image of the woman, re-
sulting in ﬁnding out what the image is. A mystery of the existence of time and
space that bundles and enables the relation between the object and the subject
who sees, lies indeed in the time delay between the time we begin to glance
at the paintings unmindfully and the time we ﬁnd something there. Therefore,
the paintings realize (more than express) the very time and space, that is, the
medium. Otherwise, the paintings cannot express the space or the objects.
To reiterate, we substantively and concretely experience a void depth (a lack)
that layers of colors reproduce. When our points of view (senses) enter that lack
(the hole), devote themselves to it, and cannot escape from it, we can obtain
acceptance in peace by naming it as “a woman” and recognize it again. We
cannot deny this accepting process is not what is referred to as the perception of
beauty. However, to name it “beauty” and make it completed in the way of pre-
established harmony will prevent us from understanding the essential crisis of
the process. The object is both assumed and broken down, therefore perception
will become possible; that is, the production of admiration. Recognizing the clues
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of the depth or the gap of the internal perception to see the paintings without
assurance of the object outside leads us to rediscover and recreate the object
that is the image of the woman. It is indeed a real pleasure to admire these
paintings. If we live in peace with the perception of beauty, comprehending real
pleasure becomes diﬃcult.
From Drawing to Painting. The understanding process of the workshop par-
ticipants who were told to reproduce the paintings after viewing them has been
estimated based on the video-recorded physical motions of the participants while
reproducing the artworks. At the beginning of the workshop (task A), the par-
ticipants received no constraints other than of time, and they reproduced the
paintings with the free use of all twelve pastel crayon colors. In that period, they
reproduced the paintings using many drawing techniques. To state it concretely,
most of them tried to reproduce the object by demarcating outlines on the draw-
ing paper. This means that most of the participants subjectively comprehended
what the “object” is in the original paintings. But by the time for tasks C and D,
Okazaki directed the participants to use only two colors, and furthermore he told
participants to use the colors one after another in order, like a two-colored print.
Around this time, most of the participants drastically changed their method of
reproduction from a drawing-based method to a painting-based one, and the
quality of their reproduced paintings obviously improved. One example is shown
in ﬁgure 2.
Indirect Control as “Techne”. In this workshop, the facilitator Okazaki
did not give the participants direct-control directions: for example, “Do not use
line drawing,” “Do surface painting,” and so on. It was found that the phase
transition of behavior patterns occurred and produced the same structure of
the original works when indirect-control directions were given. That is, the con-
straints on use of the painting tools rigidly restricted the temporal order of tool
usage, and the directions functioned as boundary conditions for the participants’
behaviors, leading to a desirable way of understanding the intentions of artists in
order to capture the surrounding world. The distinction between direct and the
indirect controls which is mentioned here comes from Deguchi’s study which pro-
poses the model of multi-subject complex systems (Deguchi, 2004). With direct
control, the local constraints regulate the agent’s behavior and the interactions
between the agents for each. With indirect control, on the other hand, a global
framework determines the global behavior of the whole system.
Giving explanations in advance about the creation process of the arts and
direct speciﬁcations for the creation method seems as if it would be a more ef-
fective way to understand and create the arts. However, the results of this study
suggested that indirect control is a more eﬃcient way to provide constraints
to people’s unconsciousnesses than through other, direct ways. Rather than by
transmitting directions directly to the consciousness, indirect control provides
constraints to the unconscious self which are recognized and aﬃrmed afterwards
by the consciousness. In this way the body’s behaviors can be manipulated.
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Fig. 2. Behaviors of the participants. Dark gray and light gray areas indicate drawing
behaviors and painting behaviors, respectively.
Without an appeal to changing behavior at an unconscious level, directions en-
counter resistance from aspects such as the consciousness’ self-awareness and
self-respect, which does not lead to reﬂection on the behavior or a change in its
direction.
Additionally, the reason that the people recognize indirect controls as “indi-
rect” is that they are not aware of the body’s consideration as “consideration”, or
regard it as involuntary. We can note that creators or those who can understand
the creation process are aware that the most direct form of control in terms of
skill transfer or understanding the works comes actually through an appeal to
the body’s consideration to indirect intelligence; in other words, direct percep-
tion. While this type of consciousness is peripheral and excluded from the point
of view of the language center’s functions, it is organized as a language in itself.
This is in terms of “techne,” the intelligence used to construct artifacts. The
purpose of this workshop was to reveal empirically how “techne” is structured.
If this is regarded as unconscious, it comes from suppressing consciousness that
is governed by a special linguistic language.
In task B, early on between the tasks involving crayon reproductions of the
paintings, the participants expressed their linguistic comprehension of the paint-
ings (that is to say, to express the painting in words), which is not discussed here
because the detailed analysis is not ﬁnished. Some participants who compre-
hended nothing but the outline of the object in the painting in the reproducing
tasks nevertheless picked up the properties of the woman ﬁgure’s depression as
shown by using the word “pensive” for “Renee” by Matisse. That participant
may have correctly perceived something at the unconscious level of sense, though
they were not aware of the structure of paint layers on the canvas. An aim of
this workshop was to specify the logical structure of ways to comprehend multi-
layered paintings, involving comprehension through the motions of reproduction
and linguistic comprehension with free associations that seemed to have no re-
lation to each other. In future, we have to develop more precise methods to
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investigate the invisible multi-layered logical structure without either ﬂushing it
into the black box of unconsciousness or having exaggerated feelings that we can
perceive consciously.
Natural Computing and Ambient Space. So far, research on indirect con-
trol has been mainly discussed in terms of problems of contrived controls (poli-
tics, economics, drama, etc.) (Deguchi, 2004; Goan, Fukaya, 2007; Goan, Fukaya,
Tsujita, 2008). Among this research, a system was modelled which acted as a
dual dynamics system, in which the controller and the agents to be controlled
were completely divided and there are strong interactions, which revealed the
mechanism of exchanging information or of the state transitions in the system.
On the other hand, the idea of contrived controls which adhere to the concept
of “control,” i.e. the concept that the controller should control other agents as
it likes, is considerably weakened in the concept of natural computing proposed
by Suzuki (Suzuki, 2012).
The following example explains this idea using the relationship between plants,
harmful insects, and their natural enemies (Suzuki, Sakai, 2012). Plants (system)
cannot and need not directly recognize both harmful insects and their natural en-
emies as objects. But the plant behaves (changes the conditions of the endocrine
system) as if it can recognize insects and their natural enemies and control their
behavior. What is the implementation mechanism for such plants’ natural con-
trolling behaviors? The purpose of their research is understood as clarifying the
algorithm that induces state transitions in natural systems. Here we can note
the possibility that the plant (system) can and may recognize the following two
items, although they cannot directly recognize the existence or the behavior of
harmful insects and natural enemies of the insects.
1. Recognition of the endocrine system’s change: identify the trigger of the
change and pay attention to the response relations.
2. Recognition of the ﬂuctuations of the system’s constancy (homeostasis): in
other words, for example, perceive rhythmic change in physical conditions
that get worse or become better.
A system involves these ﬂuctuations and changes in a living process as part of its
existence, even if it cannot directly recognize the objects outside the system; that
is called “nature” in the concept of natural computing, and we call it “nature
A.” Therefore, when we assume a consciousness, the system becomes capable
of being comprehended and measurable, even it is unconscious. That is like the
weather condition.
Thus the ambient space can be understood as the space which enables the sys-
tem to ﬂuctuate as an adjusting process, or the ﬁeld itself of which both measur-
ing and adjusting simultaneously exist. Namely, that is the ﬁeld or space itself
in which a system, a species called plants in this example, can exist and be con-
ﬁned. In other words, the ambient space is the ﬁeld that surrounds and conﬁnes
the plants’ intersubjective system, which is composed of surfaces and parameters
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that can be measured and extended. To make it possible for the plants to cap-
ture the critical discontinuities in the space – the change of physical conditions or
the change of weather – is the very function of the ambient space. So the plants
(system) become able to recognize the ﬁeld on which they have dependence and
in which they localize themselves, and in which they are able to exist. The ﬁeld
is comprised of the conditions that enable the plants’ recognition, measurement,
and computation of the ﬁeld. Therefore the ﬁeld enables the plants to measure
and to compute the process of measurement or computing.
We call this ﬁeld “nature X” to distinguish it from “nature A” previously
mentioned. Nature X cannot be an “object” but be the “thing-in-itself.” Nature
X itself is the process of computing and recognition. It can be said that nature X
is the recognition of the boundary between the inside (in which computing and
the recursive repetition process are possible) and the outside (in which those are
broken down). The preestablished harmony in recognition of the ﬁeld induces no
measurement or computing processes. The “repetition process” seems to repeat
the same things, but actually it is not just repeating them. The signiﬁcant part
of the repetition process is to clarify the medium itself: the time ﬂow whose
homogeneity and continuity are never assured, in which it is possible for the
computing process to induce the same solution every time. In other words, the
importance of the computing process is not in the solution but in the recognition
and the certainty that there are processes with no eﬀect on the solution, and
there are inevitable and irreversible distances. Not a computational solution, but
the computing process itself is crucial to the medium property.
If we have an algebraic problem such as “what is one plus one?”, the repetition
process always induces the same solution, “two.” But the short (or long) time
lag for reaching the solution is the essential issue. The very time delay of this
type produces the incident (or the art). This is not the issue with beauty. The
concept of beauty is nothing but a convenient idea that ﬁnalizes the time ﬂow,
which is required to solve the puzzle. Due to indications that any diﬃcult puzzle
can be solved, it is easy to forget that there are valid distances, such as time
ﬂow and space.
Consider why the paintings do not consist of a uniﬁed algorithm. For example,
the paintings diﬀer from the input transfer, from the sensed information to the
output, still picture. Why is this so? What does the painting of the space mean?
What does the admiration of the paintings represent? What is the diﬀerence
between the admiration of the paintings and the recognition of the paintings?
To address these questions, we would like to consider the following method,
inspired by Aristotle’s idea of entelekheia (Aristotle, 350BC): the signiﬁcance
of the computation (one’s life) requests the computation (living) process. If we
need only the results of cause and eﬀect, the computing process may become
redundant and could quickly be omitted. When the computation solutions are
deﬁnite, the computation process is unnecessary. The process, the time delay, and
the distance mentioned above are necessary for a slime mold, for example, but
they have no meaning for observers who know the solution and regard knowing
the solution as the computation. For those observers, the process of admiration
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becomes unnecessary. However, we emphasize that it is indispensable. This sum-
marizes many of the signiﬁcant issues explored in this workshop in the museum
as well as Okazaki’s goals (Okazaki, 2001). The concept of natural computing
seems to involve the desire to avoid contrived control or the oppressive feeling
from a regimented society. But even if this is so, the concept of computation
tends to lead to a state that is called natural beauty, whether it is similar to
that of Kantian philosophy or not. We fear that this tendency makes it diﬃcult
for us to recognize the medium property around the computation process; that
is, the process itself, the distance, and the time ﬂow. In order to avoid this ten-
dency, we suggest that a future problem in the ﬁeld of philosophy will be to bind
an ethical stop standard to prevent it.
5 From the Integration of Multiple Viewpoints to the
Dissection of Multi-logical Types and Asynchronous
Cooperation
In this section, we would like to discuss the method of learning for those of us
living in the ambient space. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the
incident that we call learning in this study is the step up of the logical type in the
invisible meta-frame. We propose that the step up of the logical type happens
when we accept that it is a dissection of the multi-logical types, deserting the
idea that it is the integration of multiple viewpoints. The integration of multiple
viewpoints is the idea that we cannot directly perceive the object itself, but we
can reconstruct a uniﬁed image of the object using some or several numbers
of partial perceptions. Namely, this means reconstruction of the uniﬁed object
from multiple viewpoints. This also requires an assumption that there are some
or many viewpoints to one object. As a one-to-many problem, this idea assumes
the existence and the conditions of one (object X) from the beginning.
One diﬃculty with this idea is that it assumes the position (i.e., the unity)
of the subject to the object. In this idea, however the viewpoints change, all the
viewpoints are the viewpoints of the identiﬁed subject and it is tacitly assumed
that their mutual continuity is assured. The position of the subject in the meta-
level that integrates the multiple viewpoints is not considered to change. The
viewpoints do not vary. There is no change in the relationship between the object
and the subject that has an a priori assumption. Neither is there the deﬁnition
nor the logical type of the space that surrounds them.
We suppose that this idea does not explain the learning mechanism. We insist
that the logical type, including the relation between the subject and the object,
must undergo changes or recomposition, not just a conversion of multiple view-
points, or otherwise not only the relation between the subject and the object
cannot change but also will not become stable. This is because a subject that in-
tegrates multiple viewpoints cannot avoid the inﬁnite backward projection. The
subject is always located outside the space. In other words, the subject of such a
deﬁnition is not able to touch and to comprehend the ambient space that enables
and ensures the relation between the subject and the object as a meta-context.
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It is natural to consider that learning occurs when the transfer and a dis-
section of the multi-logical types happens, not the transfer and the integration
of the multiple viewpoints. To elaborate, not only are the multi-logical types
dissected but they also act in parallel and asynchronously, without being uni-
ﬁed or integrated that is, they interact, relate to each other, shuﬄe the domain
layers of each logic, and indirectly control each other. In other words, the step
up of the logical type happens when lots of dissected individual logical domains
(autonomous computing circuits, i.e., the algorithms) asynchronously cooperate.
We have to consider that the subject exists only in ambient space. The produc-
tion process and the meta-context, the meta-level and the ambient space are
comprehensive only in the acting process.
Consider the admiration of the paintings. From the traditional view of “phys-
ical space” – that the object ﬂoats in an empty space– the paintings (and the
space inside) and the subjects that admire them are distinguished from each
other. Until now it has been thought that this space is what accepts “the sub-
jects who admire the paintings (and the space inside)” and surrounds them. But
adopting this idea makes it seem that the subject in such a space is fated to
receive the inevitable inﬁnite backward projection as mentioned above.
However, ambient space is quite a diﬀerent deﬁnition of space from the tra-
ditional one. This associates with how the paintings represent and recognize the
space surrounding the subjects who admire the paintings (and the space inside)
where the ﬁgure-ground reversal perception cannot exist.
Before explaining the meaning of the previous sentence, we would now like to
conﬁrm the relation between the ﬁgure and the ground in the painting. Because
the ﬁgure is the projection of the observer’s diﬀerentiable codes, saying it is
understood as “ﬁgure-ground reversal” is not correct, but “ﬁgure-ﬁgure switch”
may rather correctly express the phenomenon. The strange phenomenon which
occurs is that invisible things suddenly become recognized as ﬁgures. This is
just a confusion of the observer’s recognition circuitry. Similar to the territorial
problem, it is nothing but the diﬀerence or ﬂuctuation between the projection
of the concept and the substance onto which the concept is projected. For other
examples, it is similar to asking, “Is this a lizard or a gecko?” or “Is this a
duck or a rabbit?” when we see an animal for the ﬁrst time. As is well known,
the duck-rabbit ambiguous image occurs in the natural world, therefore, these
examples are more general phenomena than the problem of the paintings.
Learning in the ambient space is not a matter of “ﬁgure-ground reversal per-
ception” but of “ﬁgure-ﬁgure switch.” The parallelizing and recomposition of the
basic logic is regarded as admirable in the paintings. For example, the ground
emerges at the boundary between nature and artiﬁciality, or between fortuity and
inevitability. When this relation is reversed, this is the “ground-ground switch.”
This concept is associated with the realization of artiﬁcial intelligence or the ar-
tiﬁcial soul. The boundary between a human that has intelligence and a material
body that has no intelligence becomes invalid, and their positions reverse, like a
philosopher who, in contemplation of a desk, ﬁnds himself contemplated by the
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desk. The ground-ground switch also means that we may happen to detect the
critical edge behind the ground.
Here, we should note that Bateson’s learning theory, the step up of the logical
types, and Gibson’s learning theory of perception are coupled with each other.
In our workshop at the art museum, we showed that there could exist a way
of perceiving the ground-ground switch, the perception of surfaces’ layouts, by
stepping up from the logical type of ﬁgure-ground reversal perception – the
ﬁgure-ﬁgure switch. It has been said that when we observe the ﬁgure, the ground
(the background as the medium) is invisible. However, this is not true. On the
contrary, we found that we can even perceive the depth at the interface of the
ground-ground switch through the workshop experiences and the theory. This
is an astonishing discovery that shows the possibility of ﬁnding out the logical
crack for dissecting the world, leading to a radical change in our understanding
of the relations of whole surfaces.
1. Breakthrough happens inside ourselves; breaking our eggshell, we will hatch
in another world.
2. Visual sensation without vivid focusing is the very fundamental condition
that the biological organ “retina” uses to capture the optical ﬂow. This
enables our body to comprehend the space that surrounds us and continues
to move on.
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